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An object lesson on the importance 
of reducing emissions from tropical 
rainforest destruction occurred in the 
year following the Kyoto COP 3 meeting, 
when a major El Niño event which spread 
across South East Asia caused severe 
drought, widespread fires and destruction 
of forests and forest peat soils. As much 
as a third of global CO2 emissions during 
this extreme climate event in 1998 could 
be attributed to destruction of tropical 
forest.
It took eight years, until COP 11 in 
Montreal, for REDD to regain traction 
within the UNFCCC, when agreement 
was reached to launch a two-year initiative 
to examine the potential of REDD. This 
subsequently lead to the decision at 
COP 13 to include a somewhat expanded 
concept of REDD, so-called REDD-Plus, 
in the Bali Action Plan on mitigation 
strategies, in preparation for anticipated 
agreements at Copenhagen. At Bali 
the findings of the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change were presented and 
rainforest destruction and degradation 
was identified as accounting for as much 
as 17.3% of annual global emissions – in 
the order of 8 giga-tonnes per annum. 
However by 2008-2009, in the midst 
of a global recession, reduced drivers 
of deforestation, more effective actions 
by rainforest nations to counter illegal 
rainforest removals (especially by 
Indonesia and Brazil), and in the absence 
of a major El Niño event, emissions from 
destruction of forests may have dropped 
to as low as 10% of the global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. I mention this wide 
range in rainforest emissions to illustrate 
their huge variability, and the complexity 
of factors involved, and the challenges 
that lie ahead for design of effective 
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REDD Progress 
at Copenhagen
While there has been widespread grief about the stalled 
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) process following COP15 at Copenhagen, 
there were some areas of positive progress.1 One of the most 
notable was in the development of agreements on reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD). REDD was excluded from the Kyoto Protocol 
because at the time the policy and methodological issues were 
considered too difficult to resolve. 
Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 2 – February 2010 – Page 9
REDD methodologies, particularly the 
determination of national baselines.
To halt destruction and degradation 
of tropical rainforests is unquestionably 
of critical importance to maintain their 
huge carbon stocks and to conserve 
evolution’s most outstanding terrestrial 
ecosystems. REDD provides a unique 
opportunity for placing a sufficiently high 
value on intact rainforest ecosystems so as 
to beget a multitude of actions for their 
conservation. In this regard the challenge 
is to develop policies, methodologies 
and regulations that will facilitate 
the considerable financial transfers 
required to support these actions while 
simultaneously achieving other desired 
outcomes, notably sustainable economic 
development and nature conservation, 
the defining elements that make up 
REDD-Plus. 
REDD is particularly difficult 
territory to navigate and thus far much 
of the path-finding work has been 
undertaken outside the UNFCCC, in the 
voluntary market, and through REDD 
capacity-building initiatives such as 
the UN-REDD programme, the World 
Bank Forest Carbon Partnership, and 
by countries such as Norway (support 
of Brazil’s Amazon Fund) and Australia 
(REDD partnerships with Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea). In the circumstances 
of ‘catching up with the play’ on REDD, 
the COP 15 sub-groups working on 
policy and methodological agreements 
made significant progress.
The ad hoc working group on 
cooperative action (AWG-LCA) drafted 
a policy agreement that provided for 
REDD-Plus mitigation actions (and 
various non-REDD initiatives) to be 
funded under a proposed climate facility. 
The draft reached the final stages of 
preparation with minimal unresolved 
(bracketed) text; however, its completion 
was thwarted in Copenhagen’s final 
chaotic days. The AWG-LCA draft 
prepared the ground rules for financing 
REDD-Plus from developed countries, 
and between the lines appears to have left 
room for private funding. Unfortunately, 
detail on ‘who is to pay, how much, when 
and how’ was not mapped out, and seems 
still a long way from being resolved.
A text on REDD-Plus methodologies 
was agreed upon by the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technical Advice 
(SBSTA) and subsequently adopted 
by the COP. Its key decisions included 
recommending that historical emissions 
provide the baselines for REDD with 
adjustment for national circumstances, 
and recognition of the need for full and 
effective engagement with indigenous 
peoples. The issue of accounting at 
a national or sub-national (project-
based) level was covered by providing for 
establishment of ‘robust and transparent 
national forest monitoring systems, and 
if appropriate, sub-national systems as 
part of national monitoring systems’.
The sub-text on inclusion of sub-
national systems ‘if appropriate’ is 
prescient of how project-based REDD 
initiatives might be provided for. Private 
sector interests have the potential to 
deliver massive funding for REDD, 
and to deliver innovative designs in 
pursuit of the very real potential for 
large-scale and low-cost generation of 
REDD project offsets, albeit with all 
the social responsibility, sustainable 
development and conservation goals 
included. The arbitrage opportunity for 
profit between generation cost and on-
sale value in carbon markets, and the 
level of regulatory surety (de-risking) 
will determine the scale of private sector 
financing and engagement. Developing 
countries hosting REDD national fund-
based programme can be expected to 
charge fees or levies on their carbon 
exports. The alternative (of private 
project-based approaches) risks transfer 
pricing scams that would dwarf those 
that have long shamed the tropical timber 
trade, whereby very little of the value of 
the rainforest product, in this case carbon 
offsets, remains in the country of origin, 
the greater part ending up in offshore 
accounts in tax-efficient jurisdictions.  
Developing countries have become 
highly sensitised to economic neo-
colonialism, whereby their remaining 
rainforest assets risk being permanently 
locked up under REDD conservation 
agreements – effectively a loss of 
sovereignty – while the wealth generated 
from REDD offsets is realised elsewhere. 
Hence the emergence of the ‘national 
funds’ approach, championed by Brazil 
with its Amazon Fund.
In the absence of a Kyoto successor 
agreement, the sub-group agreements 
on REDD will remain stranded and 
largely ineffective. It is possible that 
the UNFCCC process has reached an 
impasse that cannot be breached, at least 
in the urgent time-span required to reign 
in GHG levels. Copenhagen forcefully 
demonstrated a ‘new play’ at the table 
of climate change politics, and while 
120 heads of state equivocated under the 
UNFCCC process, former outsiders, the 
US and four major developing countries 
(China, India, Brazil and South Africa) 
by-passed the old Kyoto club nations and 
delivered the Copenhagen Accord ‘fait 
accompli’.
The three-page Copenhagen Accord 
set an objective of limiting global 
warming to a maximum of 2°C, but 
did not specify any emission reduction 
targets. However, the accord made a 
firm financial commitment requiring 
developed countries to facilitate the 
provision of US$30 billion to developing 
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countries over 2010–2012, increasing to 
US$100 billion per annum by 2020, to 
help them reduce emissions and adapt. 
REDD funding is provided for within 
this financial commitment.
REDD was also strongly endorsed in 
the accord text:
We recognize the crucial role of 
reducing emissions from deforesta-
tion and forest degradation and 
the need to enhance removals of 
greenhouse gas emissions by forests 
and agree on the need to provide 
positive incentives to such actions 
through the immediate establishment 
of a mechanism including REDD-
plus to enable the mobilization of 
resources from developed countries.
The accord (unlike the SBSTA text) 
gives explicit recognition of the need 
for GHG removals by forests, making 
room for inclusion of afforestation 
and reforestation (A/R) sequestration 
alongside REDD. This is critically 
important because demand for fuel 
wood and timber is a major driver of de-
forestation, and in the absence of supply-
substitution from A/R programmes 
developing countries have no hope of 
achieving forest conservation through 
‘stand alone’ REDD programmes. It is 
instructive that New Zealand was only 
able to implement sustainable harvesting 
of indigenous forest with the passage of 
the Forests Amendment Act 1993, and 
finally choke-off native forest harvesting. 
This was only possible because by this 
time a growing surplus of wood from our 
planted forests rendered native timber 
economically insignificant.
With the Copenhagen Accord the 
US has taken on the mantle of global 
(co)–leadership on climate change, 
potentially sidestepping (and knee-
capping) the UNFCCC process. The US’s 
focus is very much on what it can achieve 
domestically, then ‘internationalising’ 
those actions. However, it remains to 
be seen whether the US can sustain a 
leadership role, given the swing against 
the Democrats ahead of the mid-term 
elections in late 2010, and the now 
very real risk that the Kerry-Boxer Bill 
containing the proposed US cap-and-
trade system may not be supported in the 
Senate. It is notable that the US cap-and-
trade design provides for up to a billion 
offsets per annum to be sourced offshore, 
a clear preparation for massive inflows of 
low-cost REDD credits. This would serve 
to reduce the entry cost of a US cap-and-
trade system and help appease major 
emitter industries. The ability to harness 
REDD has therefore become critical to 
the US aspirations to introduce a cap-
and-trade scheme. Interestingly, the 
Kerry-Boxer Bill provides for a country 
fund approach to REDD financing and 
explicitly excludes direct project-based 
approaches.
The USís suitability for leadership is 
also undermined by it having the lowest 
2020 emission target (and second highest 
per capita emissions levels) amongst the 
developed economies.
Notwithstanding the difficulties 
ahead for reaching an effective global 
agreement on climate change, under 
either the UNFCCC or some grouping 
of the worldís leading economies, REDD 
has clearly become accepted as a key 
mitigation strategy. In the absence of 
a global agreement, it is almost certain 
that REDD will be part of bilateral or 
regional initiatives. While international 
negotiations continue, REDD capacity-
building initiatives will continue in 
concert, as will REDDís involvement in 
voluntary markets. By the time post-
Kyoto compliance markets are activated, 
either under a new international 
agreement or alternatively by way of 
domestic cap and trade regimes in the 
US and Europe, REDD programmes in 
the major rainforest countries should be 
ready to contribute.
New Zealand is already contributing 
globally to REDD by virtue of its log 
and wood product exports. These and 
other managed forest wood supplies 
substitute for wood that otherwise would 
have to be sourced from the worldís 
primary forests. At this time there is 
no price recognition for this; however, 
opportunities could arise in the future, 
with developing countries linking their 
REDD programme with wood imports 
to specifically address leakage issues.
The New Zealand government should 
be preparing the ground for bilateral and 
regional agreements to enable REDD 
units to enter the New Zealand ETS, 
thereby providing New Zealand emitters 
with access to offsets in the lower-cost 
range, whilst supporting constructive 
outcomes in developing countries with 
respect to their indigenous people, 
sustainable economic development and 
rainforest conservation. 
1  I would like to thank Bryan Smith for his helpful comments 
in preparing this paper.  
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